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THE HARDSHIPS AND INCONVENIENCES: The 
Manatee River Forts during the Seminole Wars 
 
 
Dr. Joe Knetsch 
 
Descriptions of the land in Florida found in 
the promotional brochures of the mid to late 
nineteenth century tell of a new Riviera or 
"The Italy of America" or some other such 
romantic vision. One would hardly suspect 
that the vision presented in these fanciful 
writings of the early advertisers would 
somehow be a misrepresentation of the 
truth. Convincingly, they often told of a 
verdant land being exposed for the first time 
to the pulse of civilization and capable of 
growing any number of exotic tropical fruits 
which would readily find a market in the 
thriving industrial towns of the northern 
cities. It would be very apparent to anyone 
who came to this new Canaan that the land 
was very well worth fighting for and the 
Seminoles, notorious murderers and lazy 
savages, had every reason to attempt to 
prevent the progressive forces of Anglo 
civilization from seizing this Eden and 
making it their own. Indeed, why let any 
group of uncouth Indians prevent the 
settlement of this new land by those wishing 
to plant oranges, enjoy walks on the beaches 
and generally bring culture to the wilderness 
 
Those who served the forces of "civiliza-
tion" in places like Forts Armstrong, 
Myakka, Starke, Crawford, Hamer or Camp 
Smead found that romance was far from the 
reality of the frontier. Life was difficult, 
tenuous and often short. A raid by hostile 
Indians could bring instant death, loss of 
property and life savings or the end of a 
dream. The reality of intolerable insects, 
dangerous reptiles, crowded conditions, 
constant fear and an unpredictable nature 
made life in these outposts almost 
insufferable to those forced by 
circumstances to endure these hardships. 
The constant demands for food, water and 
fuel meant a daily exposure to possible 
death. The often overcrowded area meant 
short tempers, instant rivalries and the threat 
of violence, domestic or otherwise. Culture 
and civilization were far from the reality of 
these outposts of defense. 
 
As those who have read Janet Snyder 
Matthews’ Edge of Wilderness or heard 
Dewey Dye, Jr. back in January of 1967 
know, there was only one "permanent" for-
tification on the Manatee River during the 
Second Seminole War, it was called Fort 
Starke and was situated near the mouth of 
the Manatee River. It was established on 
November 25, 1840, and abandoned on 
January 5, 1841.1 This fort served as a 
jumping off point for expeditions up the 
Manatee River and its tributaries. Dewey 
Dye, Jr. reports that the Post Returns for this 
installation indicate that it was manned by 
officers and men from the U. S. Army First 
Infantry, headquartered at Fort Armistead on 
Sarasota Bay, and commanded by Captain 
A. S. Miller. Companies B, E and F 
comprised the garrison and totaled about 
140 men. Dye also speculates that no actual 
construction of a fortification took place and 
that the position was simply referred to as a 
"post", indicating no permanent buildings.2 
The river had been visited many times by 
the military prior to the establishment of this 
post. 
 
One of the first such scouts took place on 
March 18, 1836, very early in the Second 
Seminole War. The expedition from the U. 
S. Ship Vandalia produced no results and 
the report of the territory along the river is 
bereft of information describing the physical 
nature of the area.3 The only indication of 
the topography is found in the following: 
 
"In conformity with your orders of the 16 
inst., directing me to reconnoitre an Indian 
encampment in the neighborhood of the 
Manatee river etc., I have to inform you that 
I landed the same evening, within one and a 
half miles of the spot where the Indians were 
supposed to be encamped. Our forces 
amounted to twenty five men including Lt. 
Smith from your ship, Doctor Rassler and 
the Seamen from the Vandalia, it was nearly 
dark before we arrived on the spot where 
Mr. Johnson saw the Camp the day before, 
we strictly examined the ground and the 
adjacent wood, but could not discover either 
Indian or Cattle, but we saw evident 
indications of a recent encampment, such as 
prints of Indian feet, tracks of Cattle, etc. 
We remained in the wood until seven in the 
evening, at 8 we arrived on board. Yesterday 
morning we again landed our whole force 
and commenced our march into the wood, 
taking a Southerly direction, after passing 
the ground that we visited the day before, 
we fell in with Indian and Cattle trails of 
recent date, all of which evidently tending in 
the direction of Sarazotta having an Indian 
guide with us we concluded to march on, 
and did so until we found ourselves ten 
miles in the interior of the wood. Men and 
Officers being completely jaded down, 
deemed it prudent to commence our retreat 
on the cutter. We arrived on board at 6 
P.M."4 
 
The march brought the command through 
woods on the southern bank of the river, 
however, because the exact location is not 
known, it would be nearly impossible to 
pin-point the spot today. The ground cov-
ered must have been soft and the going 
slow, because the normal distance covered 
by an army command in that day was any-
where from twelve to sixteen miles. 
However, the only true notation seen is that 
they went south through woods and no 
species is identified. 
 
Although not the only reconnaissance of the 
Manatee River area during the war, it is one 
of the more complete reports found to date. 
The major reason that fewer scouts were 
sent via the Manatee is that the Indians were 
farther away from that area than any other in 
South Florida. If one reviews the 
correspondence, it is easily seen that the 
highest concentrations of the Seminoles and 
their allies were in the Big Cypress, around 
Lake Okeechobee, near the coontie grounds 
on the southeast coast and along the 
Kissimmee River. None of these positions is 
accessible by taking the Manatee River or 
any of its tributaries. This leads to the 
question, why establish Fort Starke so late in 
the war in an area not frequented by the 
Indians or their allies 
 
It can be seen from the report of November 
24, 1840, that a concern of the army was the 
gathering of Indians along the islands of the 
coast. This short report simply noted that: 
"The 1st Regt. is scouting along the Gulf 
shore below Tampa with boats accompanied 
by a steamer and two schooners."5 Four days 
later, the 1st Infantry arrived at Fort Starke: 
"B, E, & F companies 1st Infty arrived here 
this morning, bad weather having delayed 
them. The Boat did not arrive at Fort 
Armistead until 24th inst. & was dispatched 
the next morning." read the official 
notification from Major Dearborn. The 
Major then continued his report: "I 
reconoitered the country from Ft. Armistead 
some ten or a dozen miles on my first 
arrival, and since the last rain. The country 
was wet on my first excursions, and is now 
mostly over-flowed. One of the Indians who 
accompanied me as a guide says that we will 
be obliged to swim two creeks with our 
horses on the trail leading to Peace Creek, 
and so far as I went the water was half-leg 
deep most of the way, and a very blind trail 
that the Indian was unable to follow."6 The 
watery way from anywhere to Fort Stark and 
the remainder of the territory made life 
difficult and lead to charges that the area 
may have been unhealthy, or "miasmatic" in 
the language of the day. However, the real 
reason for the fort’s founding is found 
shortly thereafter in a letter of December 11, 
1840: "It is the direction of the Commanding 
General that during the present cessation of 
operations in your district, a detachment 
under a competent officer be employed to 
stake out the inner passage leading to Fort 
Armistead, and any other channels which it 
may be deemed expedient to indicate in that 
manner. From their superior durability cedar 
stakes should be employed, if practicable."7 
Thus, the only reason for the founding of 
Fort Starke is the protection and scouting 
out of a route via an "inner" passage from 
Tampa Bay to Fort Armistead, on Sarasota 
Bay. This passage being established and 
staked out, the fort was soon disbanded. 
 
The navigability of the Manatee River made 
any form of reinforcement in the area 
relatively easy. This was early recognized 
by everyone and may be the reason Indians 
did not establish themselves on the river 
after the occupation of Tampa Bay by the 
United States Army at Fort Brook. The early 
settlers of the area certainly noted the ease 
of communication available via the river and 
almost everyone of those who settled under 
the Armed Occupation Act of 1842, chose 
sites on or near the river’s banks. The 
success of the early settlers depended greatly 
upon the ease of shipment and receiving of 
goods and materials. That the area attracted 
the such capable leaders and plantation men 
as the Gambles, Gates and Bradens is ample 
indication of this ease of communication. 
The almost constant threat of Indian attack 
made the Manatee frontier highly 
susceptible to rumor of same and led to 
much correspondence between the settle-
ment and Tampa Bay, the regional head-
quarters for the army. Through most of the 
year 1846, these communications were car-
ried on with the colony’s leader, Sam Reid.8 
His passing in 1847 meant the leadership 
fell upon the capable shoulders of Josiah 
Gates and Robert Gamble. These men, along 
with Joseph Braden, carried on com-
munication with the major State and army 
leaders in Tallahassee and Tampa. Yet, 
some of these very same leaders, like 
Senator James D. Westcott, also kept the 
tension at a near fever pitch with their 
questioning of the army’s representatives in 
the area.9 Trader John Darling, then at 
Charlotte Harbor and later at Payne’s Creek, 
also brought doubt on the army’s judgement, 
directly attacking the personal motives of 
Indian Agent John Casey.10 By 1849, 
enough of this type of material and rumor 
had spread that suspicions were running 
high. 
 
In that year, two incidents, well known and 
discussed by Dr. James Covington and 
others, took place at Indian River and 
Payne’s Creek which set the whole country 
on fire with war fever.11 The incident, which 
cost the lives of Captain Payne and others 
brought about a nearly full-fledged Indian 
war on the frontier. Only quick response by 
Billy Bowlegs, agent Casey and others 
prevented the final eruption at that time. On 
the Manatee frontier, the scare led to the 
establishment of Camp Manatee, Forts 
Myakka, Crawford and, most importantly, 
Hamer. The Post Returns from all of these 
encampments indicate that Fort Hamer was 
the nerve center for response to this crisis. 
Mail for all of these places was delivered to 
Hamer for distribution, Court Martials were 
held there and when the two remaining 
posts, Crawford and Myakka, were 
abandoned, their companies were sent to 
Hamer.12 When the army left Fort Hamer, in 
October of 1850, the stage was set for the 
next move in the game to remove the 
Seminoles from Florida, namely the petition 
drive and public meetings requesting State 
action. 
 
Fort Hamer, always an object of interest to 
Manatee citizens, has not been precisely 
located by proper archaeological and his-
torical research, at this time. Many claim to 
know the exact location, and they may be 
very correct. However, for our purpose, the 
situation of the fort being approximately 
fifteen miles west of Fort Crawford, on the 
south bank of the river and about ten miles 
up river, near the head of steamboat 
navigation, will suffice.13 What exactly did 
this outpost look like and what were the 
conditions under which men and women 
lived in or near this forth Dewey Dye, Jr. 
reports finding Lieutenant Hayes’ report to 
the Quartermaster General in which the 
following description is found: 
 
". . . a hospital building had been completed 
(by April 1850), 60 feet by 25 feet, 
’containing three airy wards with ceilings 11 
feet high.’ He reported that porches extended 
the whole length of the hospital building, in 
front and rear. Ends of the front porch had 
been enclosed to make two shed rooms, one 
a dispensary and the other, the store room. 
He also reported he had completed a hay 
house that had been erected to the 
dimensions 80 feet by 21 feet, height 15 
feet. He also reported that three sheds had 
been completed and it looks like a ram of 
log houses under construction to 
accommodate a garrison of three companies 
. . . He also reported [says Dye] that the 
beams, rafters and heavy timbers were cut 
from the nearby pine woods."14 
 
How does this compare to other forts con-
structed in Florida during the Seminole 
Wars The buildings at Fort Pierce were 
reported as being an officers quarters mea-
suring 124 feet by 18 feet covered with 
boards, three log enclosures covered by tar-
paulin which measured 30 feet by 15 feet 
each and a hospital which occupied a space 
28 feet by 16 feet. The area was generally 
open, no walls, and had only one blockhouse 
upon which stood the artillery pieces) and 
some rough-hewn pickets, loosely spaced.15 
Fort Drane, one of the main fortifications at 
the beginning of the Second Seminole War, 
simply took the existing buildings of 
General Duncan Clinch’s plantation, 
surrounded them with a "picketification" 
and used the main buildings, redbugs, fleas 
and all, for the officers and troops.16 
Historian Albert Manucy has described the 
construction of fortifications used in Florida 
in the following manner: 
 
"To build such a fort, you simply obtain a 
few hundred trees, cut them in 18foot 
lengths, and split them up the middle. Then 
you set them into the ground side by side 
like a fence, fasten them together with 
timbers, cut loopholes eight feet from the 
ground and build firing steps under the 
loopholes for the riflemen. Outside you dig a 
ditch that served as a kind of moat. You 
hung a strong gate, and your fort is 
practically finished."17 
 
Michael Schene, whose work on Fort Foster 
is well known by Florida historians, also 
noted the large need for trees used by the 
construction of forts similar to those 
described by Manucy. He added that the 
long poles were split, sharpened to a point 
and placed into the ground so that ten to 
fourteen feet were left above the level of the 
surrounding turf.18 Arthur Franke, in his 
work on Fort Mellon, described the fortress 
as having a three storied blockhouse in the 
center surrounded by and enclosure.19 As 
seen on any map of the forts during these 
wars, the most common plan, and it became 
the symbol for a fortification, was a 
rectangular or square structure with two 
blockhouses at opposite corners. Not sur-
prisingly, none of these types describe 
exactly what Fort Hamer must have looked 
like as detailed by Lieutenant Hayes. 
 
It has long been a popular misconception 
that all forts basically looked the same and 
provided the same protection. As can be 
seen from the above, this is definitely not 
the case in Florida. From the open air style 
found at Fort Pierce to the tight, 
blockhouse-enclosure type of Fort Mellon, 
Florida’s fortification differed widely. 
Perhaps the greatest reason for this diversity 
is the availability of useable wood. In areas 
where pine and hardwood are plentiful, the 
enclosure type of fortification was used, 
whereas in neighborhoods where such wood 
was scarce or expensive to procure, the more 
open style was adopted. This would help to 
explain the rich variations found in Florida 
fort construction. 
 
Life for those living at the fort may have 
been a bit dull and routine, once the pattern 
had been set. Troops were constantly on 
rotation scouting the territory for possible 
Indian signs and keeping whites from the 
designated "Indian Boundary". If the post 
were to be permanent, there would have 
been regular gardening to attend to, as, by an 
1819 law, permanent military installations 
were required to have a garden to provide 
vegetables and grains for the troops. 
However, as Fort Hamer was not regarded 
as a permanent post, this probably did not 
happen. Which meant that subsistence for 
the troops and those dependent on them had 
to be shipped into the area and stored, which 
was probably the purpose of the large "hay 
building" constructed by Lieutenant Hayes. 
It is notable that the location of the fort, as 
noted by Ms. Matthews in her book, was at 
the head of steamboat navigation for the 
river. This reinforces the conclusion that the 
materials were shipped in and stored at Fort 
Hamer, which then distributed the materials 
and rations needed to Forts Crawford and 
Myakka. Shipping rations and materials to 
other posts meant that the army, most likely, 
had to construct the roads to these outposts. 
It is significant that George Cordon Meade, 
the leader of Union troops at Gettysburg, 
when constructing his maps of southern 
Florida in 1850-51 noted that the road from 
Fort Crawford to Fort Myakka, a distance of 
between 16 and 17 miles, was a "good road" 
while that headed east from Fort Crawford 
needed a lot of work to make it usable.20 
Road duty, like gardening, was part of the 
required work routine found at most military 
posts. 
 
One of the major reasons for the location of 
Fort Hamer, as just noted, was its position at 
the head of steamboat navigation. It must be 
noted, regardless of the fertility of Manatee’s 
fabled lands, that forage and food were very 
expensive in Florida and that it was cheaper 
to have it shipped to the military posts from 
places such as Baltimore, Philadelphia and 
elsewhere. During the Second Seminole 
War, for example, one consignment to 
Florida was described as follows: 
 
"I herewith transmit a statement showing the 
quantity of Forage shipped to several depots 
in Florida since the 26th ultimo. Captain 
Crossman reports that he is now loading a 
vessel with Hay at Boston destined for 
Tampa which will carry 700 bales, and one 
for Savannah which will carry 800. Captain 
Tompkins is loading a vessel at Philadelphia 
with Forage which will carry from six to 
seven hundred bales of hay and 6 to 8 
thousand bushels of grain. Captain 
Dusenbery has taken up a vessel for the 
same depot which will carry about 7000 
bushels of grain and will sail in a few days; 
and Captain Hetzel is now loading a vessel 
at Alexandria for Saint Marks which will 
carry about 8000 Bushels of grain and is 
expected to sail on the 12th instant."21 
 
These large quantities of forage and grain 
indicate some of the problems of supplying 
troops for campaigns in Florida. The major 
reason for these shipments is the relatively 
undeveloped state of agriculture in the state 
in the 1840s and 1850s. The concentration 
on cotton in the northern tier of counties and 
the disorganized state of affairs in the 
southern portion caused by the wars, or 
threats of war, made these types of ship-
ments a necessity. 
 
The forts also provided medical treatment, 
such as it was, to the surrounding 
population. Although this was not the rec-
ommended way to get medical attention and 
the army did not encourage the practice, it 
was fairly common to have the post surgeon 
look at the local populace when time and 
facilities warranted it. One of the reasons for 
this was to check this group for possible 
communicable diseases which may infect 
the fighting force. The rate of sickness at 
many of the posts in Florida was the major 
factor in closing most of the installations 
during the so-called "sickly season", i.e. the 
rainy season. Fort Hamer was served by an 
"Assistant Surgeon", the title given to 
doctors who did not have enough time in the 
army to rise to the rank of surgeon, which 
Dr. William Strait, who has written 
extensively on medical history in the 
Sunshine State, informs me, could take as 
many as ten to fifteen years. Thus, when 
Assistant Surgeon Sloan replaced Assistant 
Surgeon Ballard on March 24, 1850, this did 
not mean that the post, and surrounding 
population, received less competent medical 
attention than a station with a full-fledged 
surgeon.22 
 
One of the major problems on the frontier 
posts was that caused by alcohol. Not only 
did the troops have to guard against 
unscrupulous whites illegally selling liquor 
to the Indians, but they had to also attempt 
to control the sale of same to their col-
leagues. Most everyone has read or heard of 
the problems suffered by U. S. Grant while 
stationed on the isolated California frontier, 
yet the same problems occurred many times 
in Florida. Although I have found no 
specific references to Fort Hamer or the 
other Manatee posts, one can assume that 
the problem was evident here as elsewhere. 
During the preceding war, Fort Micanopy 
had a severe problem with local grog shops, 
run by former soldiers.23 In the rather unique 
journal of Bartholomew M. Lynch, edited as 
the "Squaw Kissing War", this literate 
common soldier tells numerous tales of 
officers, under the influence, beating recruits 
for no reason and constantly covering up for 
each other.24 At Fort Stansbury, outside of 
Tallahassee, in 1843, Lt. Colonel Ethan 
Allen Hitchcock, then of the 3rd Infantry, 
noted the reasons for asking the discharge of 
twenty-eight men of his command. His 
reasons included: "habitual drunkard", 
"intemperate and uncleanly in his habits", 
"An incorrigable Drunkard", "A common 
Drunkard, broken down in health and from 
that cause", and "Drunkenness and bad 
conduct, being one of the greatest smugglers 
of whiskey extant."25 These incidents of the 
life of a frontier outpost give ample example 
of the problems created by alcohol and the 
boredom of post routine. 
 
Violence to persons, too, was found in every 
post on the frontier of Florida. It is 
inconceivable that the Manatee forts escaped 
this plague. Hitchcock noted that one of the 
reasons for his dismissal of one of his troops 
was, "for the murder of a fellow soldier".26 
Lieutenant Colonel William Whistler 
reported that, in January of 1842, "Sir, 
Private James Steck of C Compy 7th Infty 
murdered his wife on the 11th Inst. for 
which crime he has been turned over to the 
civil authority." For such a crime, he con-
tinued, "I have to request that he be dis-
charged [from] the service."27 The almost 
constant threat of violence between regular 
troops and the local militia forces has been 
well documented by James M. Denham and 
needs no further comment here.28 
 
However, more pleasant past-times also 
found their way into the life enjoyed by the 
frontier soldiers and local inhabitants. 
Fishing in the river seems to have been 
universal wherever in Florida a post was 
established near water. Hunting in the 
woods, too, was enjoyed by many, although 
sometimes with additional adventure. 
George Ballentine recorded the following in 
his memoirs: 
"Having so much spare time on hand, our 
men frequently took long rambles in the 
woods, especially during the fine dry 
weather; and on these ocassions, for some 
time after our arrival in Tampa Bay, there 
was a danger of getting so utterly lost in the 
woods, as not to be able to find the way 
home; thus incurring the serious risk of 
dying of starvation. An occurrence of this 
description happened shortly after our 
arrival . . . A young man belonging to our 
company had gone out shoot one day, by 
himself, and in his eagerness for the sport he 
had gone a considerable distance away from 
the path, without having paid sufficient 
attention to the direction in which it lay, to 
be able to find it again . . . . After a few 
hours search, he was discovered about six 
miles from the garrison, and within a mile 
from the footpath. He was very nearly 
exhausted when found by the party, and but 
for measures taken by the lieutenant, it is 
probable that he would have soon died of 
sheer hunger and fatigue . . . "29 
 
These instances are well known and docu-
mented by many of the soldiers who left 
memoirs and letters, e.g. George McCall and 
Alexander Webb, and need no further 
elucidation. 
 
The area of the Manatee River presented 
many opportunities such as those described 
above, however, as soon as the Scare of 
1849 was over, the attention of the citizens 
returned to the ever present "danger" of a 
serious outbreak of hostilities. This was not 
long in coming with, in late 1855, the attack 
on Lieutenant Hartsuff’s command in the 
famed banana patch of Billy Bowlegs. Once 
again the call came for the establishments of 
fortifications along the Manatee River. In 
early 1856, Hamlin V Snell’s home was 
burned: "We have reliable information direct 
from Tampa," the Alligator Advertiser 
reported on March 13th, "that in the early 
part of last week, twelve Indian warriors 
attacked the premises of Hon. H. V. Snell at 
Sarasota, about sixty miles south of Tampa, 
and nine miles from the Manatee settlement. 
A man named Cunningham was in the house 
at the time the attack was made, and was 
killed; a negro man preparing dinner in the 
kitchen made his escape. Mr. Snell 
happened to be out, at the time, and upon 
discovering the smoke of his burning 
residence, fled to Manatee."30 Shortly 
thereafter, the home of Asa Goddard, 
located near the headwaters of the Manatee, 
and within two miles of "Capt. Addison’s 
fort", was plundered and burned. The John 
Craig home, nearly one-half mile away was 
also robbed of its remaining contents.31 Less 
than a year later, Captain Clarke, of the 4th 
Artillery, found signs of fresh inhabitation 
on an island at the mouth of the Little 
Manatee River and again sent out the 
alarm.32 The war was again active on the 
Manatee frontier and the call for protection 
came fast and loud. The result was the 
establishment of Fort Armstrong, Camp 
Smead, on the 2nd of September in 1856.33 
 
Most of the Manatee settlers appear to have 
scrambled for the protection of the post(s). 
When the army threatened to leave the area, 
for lack of Indian signs, William H. Johnson 
took pen in hand and wrote to Washington 
to protest. "If all the troops are withdrawn 
from here," he noted, "the whole frontier 
from the Gulf to the Atlantic will be 
sacrificed beyond a doubt, all the settlers 
here have gathered together at different 
Posts along the frontier, have been away 
from their homes since January 1856, 
believing that the Government would move 
with energy against the Indians, and that 
they would all be permitted soon to return to 
their homes, but now after enduring all the 
hardships and inconveniences of a Camp life 
for Sixteen months we are told that all the 
troops are to be withdrawn, and we the poor 
sufferers to take the best care of ourselves 
that we can." He went on to encourage the 
government to allow the volunteers to 
remain on duty to protect the settlements 
until "Maj. Blake tries his experiment with 
Billy Bowlegs", which he doubted would 
succeed.34 
 
Not all of the Manatee settlers agreed with 
Johnson’s assessment of the situation and 
also took their pens in hand to counter his 
opinions. 
 
"The undersigned having been informed that 
the residents at the settlement on the 
Manatee River are petitioning for a guard of 
Regular Soldiers to be stationed at that 
place, beg leave to state (1) That nearly, if 
not quite all of the said residents; are now 
paid by the United States for protecting 
themselves at home & have their horses fed 
also, (2) That we do not believe that there is 
the least apprehension of any danger from 
Indians on any part of said River, (3) That 
we are residing on much more exposed 
situations on, or near, said River, having no 
neighbors near as some having families, two 
having stores with goods & owning land & 
negroes, & hitherto no guard has been 
furnished us, Nor do we now consider any 
necessary, But if Regulars are to be sent to 
this River, we ask that a fair proportion of 
them be stationed with us in order that we 
may derive a fair proportion of the profits to 
be made out of them, as they can be of no 
other use on the River."35 
 
This letter was signed by Joseph Atzroth and 
others residing at the mouth of the river at 
what he sarcastically called "Fort Atzroth". 
The fact is, Atzroth may have been closer to 
the truth of the matter than is generally 
accepted, because, most of the action was 
taking place in the Everglades and along the 
Peace River frontier, not near the settled 
areas of the Manatee, at least after the 
beginning of 1856. This debate may warrant 
more investigation. 
 
The land of the Manatee River attracted 
many during the 1840s and 1850s despite 
the trouble with the Seminoles. 2nd 
Lieutenant F. M. Follett, 4th Artillery, 
described the land he saw at the time as he 
scouted the lands of Manatee in early 1857 
as mostly pine barren with an undergrowth 
of saw palmetto and an occasional sawgrass 
pond. He mentioned only two hammocks of 
hardwood and notes that they were not of 
great extent, the largest being only one 
thousand yards across. The description is 
one of rather plain land, monotonous to a 
point.36 Yet this land attracted some of the 
most important men in Florida during the 
Territorial period and continued, under Snell 
and Gates, to provide the leadership for 
southern Florida into the days prior to the 
outbreak of the War Between the States. 
What the army missed in its reports was the 
obvious fertility and potential of the area for 
crops like sugar, tobacco and citrus. 
Although Braden and Gamble surely pro-
vided excellent examples of successful plan-
tation agriculture on the Manatee, the army 
hardly reports anything on their efforts. The 
life on the frontier may have dulled their 
senses to the potential greatness that lay 
ahead for the Manatee River so preoccupied 
were they with just trying to survive in the 
new environment we know as the Manatee 
frontier.
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